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Abstract: This paper aims to counter the recent opinion that there is a peculiar 
epistemology in the reformed Church which made it negative to natural 
theology. First it is shown that there was an early and unanimous adoption of 
natural theology as the culmination of physics and the beginning of metaphysics 
by sixteenth and seventeenth century philosophers of good standing in the 
reformed Church. Second it is argued that natural theology cannot be based on 
revelation, should not assume a peculiar analysis of knowledge and must not 
pass over demonstration.
INTroDuCTIoN
The title of this paper admittedly contains some confusion. but 
recently a  notion of an allegedly pessimistic natural theology based 
on (purportedly) revealed principles of the reformed Church has been 
circulating among philosophers.1 This notion is confused, since if the 
principles of natural theology are supernatural, then either it is not 
natural theology or it is circular. There may be a natural theology by 
philosophers in the reformed Church, but not a natural theology based 
on the doctrines of the reformed Church. It is moreover confused to 
characterise such a natural theology as pessimistic in contrast to an 
allegedly optimistic mediaeval one. For thinkers such as Anselm, 
Aquinas, Scotus and Suarez did not maintain the sufficiency of natural 
theology for Christian faith. For
all the important Catholic mediaeval thinkers held to the conviction 
that divine revelation is absolutely necessary for us to flourish as human 
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beings and that, as far as ultimate metaphysical and moral questions are 
concerned, we remain in an utterly perilous state of ignorance without it.2
It is simply misleading to characterise natural theology in the reformed 
tradition in contrast with natural theology in the mediaeval tradition.
The recent opinion can be traced to 1980. Then Alvin Plantinga 
made the historically outrageous claim that the ‘attitude’ of the reformed 
Church towards natural theology ‘ranged from tepid endorsement, 
through indifference, to suspicion, hostility and outright accusation of 
blasphemy’.3 He could do this only by ignoring authoritative confessions 
of faith as well as acknowledged works of natural theology written by 
members in good standing of the reformed Church from the sixteenth 
century to the nineteenth century,4 and by merely following the two 
modern theologians Herman bavinck and Karl barth, through whom 
he culled a few citations from John Calvin.5 Plantinga’s descriptions 
of natural theology in general and of Calvin in particular have been 
dismissed both historically and philosophically.6 Still, Alvin Plantinga, 
Nicholas Wolterstorff, and several contributors to standard reference 
works continue to repeat the claim that the reformed tradition is negative 
towards natural theology.7 
Thus there is a need to revisit the notion of natural theology in the 
reformed Church, and michael Sudduth has recently attempted to do so 
in a monograph along both historical and philosophical lines.8 The aim 
of the historical part is to rebut the misconception caused by Plantinga. 
Sudduth’s historical survey shows that the reformed Church unanimously 
endorsed natural theology early on, but that objections to natural 
theology within the reformed Church arose in early twentieth century 
Dutch and barthian neo-orthodoxy. He appears to identify two reasons 
for this opposition. First, these theologians objected to the ‘Cartesian 
and Wolffian’ view that natural theology provides the necessary basis 
for supernatural or revealed theology.9 Second, they opposed natural 
theology because they adopted Hume’s and Kant’s epistemologies.10 
Sudduth concludes that ‘the “reformed objection” to natural theology, as 
characterized by’ Plantinga and Wolterstorff, ‘simply did not exist before 
they invented it.’11 The aim of the philosophical part is next to provide 
a conceptual framework for the evaluation of objections as well as the 
clarification and defence of natural theology within the reformed Church. 
Sudduth distinguishes three objections: intuition is the only source of 
natural knowledge of God, all demonstrations about God are invalid, 
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and sin makes people unable to reason about God. These are all found 
to be overstatements. The focus of the book is then a ‘set of conceptual 
distinctions’.12 First Sudduth infers a distinction between two kinds of 
natural theology. The former arises ‘spontaneously’ in humans and not 
‘as the result of any conscious process of reasoning’, while the latter is the 
result of ‘philosophical argument’; the latter is grounded in and develops 
the former.13 Second, two ‘functions’, ‘models’ or ‘uses’ of philosophical 
arguments about God are distinguished. one is internal and the other 
‘external to dogmatic’, supernatural or revealed theology.14 Third (and 
closely related) is the distinction between the project and function of 
philosophical arguments about God,15 namely the difference between 
that there is natural theology and what natural theology is. lastly, there 
is a distinction between model-specific objections and project objections 
to natural theology;16 that is, between opposition to some model(s) of 
natural theology and to the entire project of natural theology.17
unfortunately there are both historical and epistemological problems 
in this assessment. In the first and historical part of this paper I argue for 
the correct identification of natural theology in the reformed Church, 
namely as the early, unanimous and continuous commitment to natural 
theology at the end of physics and the beginning of metaphysics – apart 
from a negligible minority of neo-orthodox theologians who opposed it 
on the authority of Hume and Kant.18 In the second and epistemological 
part I maintain the distinction between natural and supernatural 
theology, question the development of natural theology within the 
analysis of knowledge as justified true belief, and defend demonstrative 
natural theology.19
I. NATurAl THeoloGY IN THe reFormeD CHurCH 
HISTorICAllY reVISITeD
one of the major problems with the recent opinion is that it is not 
historically informed. Although Sudduth’s historical argument is better 
than most, there are several problems with it. The discussion about 
natural theology in the reformed Church will continue to be muddled 
unless these are solved. This section aims to clarify some of the historical 
issues.
First, Sudduth does not draw the right conclusion from the historical 
data. For not only does his historical survey actually show that it was 
only in the early twentieth century that a few neo-orthodox theologians 
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objected to natural theology, but that their objections were based on 
the authority of Hume and Kant rather than distinctively reformed 
doctrine.20 Yet both the title and the overall argument of the book are 
formulated in terms of ‘the reformed objection to natural theology’. 
Sudduth rightly defines ‘reformed’ in connection with the confessions 
codified by the synods of Dort and Westminster.21 However, since these 
documents endorse natural theology and the modern authors he argues 
against deviate from reformed orthodoxy on this issue, they simply do 
not represent a ‘reformed objection to natural theology’. Sudduth appears 
to acknowledge this to some extent. For not only does he write that the 
Humean and Kantian assumptions of the neo-orthodox theologians 
make it ‘exceedingly difficult to regard the objections in question as good 
project objections’, but that ‘their distance from the reformed orthodoxy 
makes them poor candidates for distinctly Reformed objections’.22 Indeed, 
such objections are ‘incompatible with Christian theism in general and 
the reformed tradition in particular.’23 Yet, the book is framed by such 
opposition, especially among Abraham Kuyper’s and Herman bavinck’s 
American followers. If these relatively unknown theologians had had 
sufficient philosophical training and had presented philosophical 
arguments, they may have merited philosophical analysis. However, their 
objections are, in Sudduth’s own words, ‘the least impressive’.24 Humean 
and Kantian assumptions could of course be refuted by philosophical 
criticism and the progress of natural science, but Sudduth is brief here.25 
These theologians appear merely to assume Hume’s and Kant’s authority 
for contextual reasons, while being badly informed of the philosophical 
rigour of their own tradition and the ancient tradition of natural 
theology.26 Their opposition seems rather to call for a different line of 
explanation.27 So, Sudduth should but did not conclude that the ‘reformed 
objection to natural theology’ is just a (philosophical) pseudo-issue.28
Second, Sudduth’s historical argument does not deal with the right 
sources in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. If we want to know 
about natural theology in the reformed Church or in general before the 
nineteenth century, it is to philosophical works and not to theological works 
that we should turn. For traditionally natural theology is a philosophical 
discipline, where ‘natural’ is synonymous with ‘physical’.29 At least 
since Aristotle the most foundational investigation of natural science 
concluded that (some) changing material things have immaterial causes: 
the First Cause and human intelligence. These arguments showed that the 
meaning of the term ‘being’ has to be extended to include both ‘material 
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being’ and ‘immaterial being’, and thus establish a science beyond physics, 
namely metaphysics. metaphysics is then theology, because no science is 
complete until the principle of its subject is known and God is the cause 
of being and the goal of metaphysics.30 This understanding of natural 
theology was from the beginning endorsed by members of good standing 
in the reformed Church. For instance, according to the influential Pietro 
martire Vermigli, physics (or generic natural science) demonstrates that 
there are immaterial things and metaphysics therefore considers ‘God 
and intelligence’.31 In the words of bartholomaeus Keckermann, ‘thus our 
system of physics concludes that God is the author and sustainer of nature’ 
and so metaphysics deals with God as ‘the foundation and source of all 
substance’.32 This is also the reason why Thomas barlow’s six metaphysical 
disputations concerning God are not so much devoted to his existence 
but to his attributes.33 In short, according to Alsted, ‘natural theology is 
judged to be a part of philosophy’.34 examples could be multiplied, but 
I trust that these sources suffice to illustrate that it is to works in physics 
and metaphysics that we have to turn in order to know about natural 
theology in the reformed Church.35 
However, Sudduth attempts to discover the nature of natural 
theology in the reformed Church from commentaries on romans 1 and 
Psalm 19 and dogmatic treatises.36 Yet, he is aware that philosophical 
arguments are actually found elsewhere: ‘These are often cast in a more 
rigorous form as logical demonstrations, resembling the argumentation 
of medieval scholasticism, and, for some arguments, ultimately the 
natural theology of Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics.’37 one reason 
for this mistaken identification appears to be his heavy dependence 
on the careful scholarship of John Platt and richard muller, which is 
theological in scope.38 but the major reason seems to be the anachronistic 
interpretation of natural theology as a theological and not a philosophical 
discipline. It would seem that natural theology is not so conceived until 
the late eighteenth century. For then the name ‘apologetics’ is coined 
for a new discipline that is placed within the theological curriculum,39 
and the background to this would seem to be the enlightenment worry 
about the reasonableness of faith in God.40 Ironically this frames natural 
theology as the particular response to the enlightenment that both the 
neo-orthodox theologians and Sudduth want to escape.
Third and last, Sudduth’s inaccurate identification of sources and 
anachronistic view of natural theology unfortunately lead him into 
confusing the traditional and modern understandings of natural 
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theology in general41 and the position of reformed orthodoxy with that 
of Descartes, leibniz and Clarke in particular.42 At least since Aristotle 
natural theology was ‘a system of theology […] independent of dogmatic 
theology’, but it plainly did not serve ‘as its rational foundation’.43 Aristotle 
did of course not acknowledge a divine revelation and those convinced 
of his conception of natural theology, such as Aquinas and philosophers 
within reformed orthodoxy, obviously did not suppose that it served as 
a rational foundation for revealed theology. Sometimes Sudduth concurs 
that the view of natural theology as the foundation of supernatural 
theology is found elsewhere. It ‘came into prominence during the 
heyday of classical foundationalism, [and] typically construed theistic 
arguments as demonstrative arguments, especially where dogmatics 
came under the influence of Cartesian and Wolffian rationalism’.44 by-
passing for now the issue of demonstration, it is nevertheless not clear 
where the subordination of supernatural theology to natural theology is 
to be located. Although (perhaps) implicit in Descartes45 and Wolff,46 the 
earliest instances may be Isaac Sigfrid and Daniel Wyttenbach; but they 
still fall short of Sudduth’s ‘pre-dogmatic model’.47 Perhaps this rationalist 
account is just a straw man produced by early twentieth-century neo-
orthodox theologians.
So, in this section I have argued that in the reformed Church natural 
theology was traditionally viewed as the culmination of physics and the 
founding of metaphysics. It was a distinctively philosophical business for 
its own sake and not an apologetical enterprise for the sake of theology. 
I have argued that Sudduth inaccurately identifies the sources of natural 
theology in the reformed Church and fails to draw the conclusion that 
the neo-orthodox objection against a modern view of natural theology 
does not merit philosophical analysis. If philosophers are not to carry on 
the pseudo-issue of ‘reformed epistemology’, they need to give heed to 
the historical sources.
II. NATurAl THeoloGY IN THe reFormeD CHurCH 
reVISITeD ePISTemoloGICAllY
Another central issue in the discussion about natural theology in the 
reformed Church, is the thesis that faith in God can be reasonable 
without arguments. Sudduth develops an epistemological argument on 
that thesis in favour of a natural theology.48 The aim is to develop ‘the 
dogmatic function’ or ‘the dogmatic model’ of natural theology ‘as part 
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of the discourse of dogmatic theology’, and to defend ‘the normative 
status of this reformed endorsement of natural theology’.49 His ‘primary 
goal’ is to defend this within the reformed tradition and the ‘second goal’ 
is to ‘clarify the nature of natural theology itself ’.50 Although sixteenth 
and seventeenth century philosophers of good standing in the reformed 
Church (as well as the late medieval thinkers they followed, especially 
Aquinas) were not as explicit and comprehensive as contemporary 
philosophers, it is possible and desirable to develop a position 
analogically extended with theirs. However, Sudduth’s epistemological 
conception of natural theology is problematic and this section will show 
that it confuses natural and supernatural theology, presumes knowledge 
as justified true belief, and prejudges demonstration.
First, Sudduth confuses rather than clarifies natural theology. 
He recognizes that ‘the dogmatic model of natural theology’ may be 
circular; namely that ‘Scripture would supply the actual premises of 
theistic arguments’.51 He wants to ‘avoid reducing natural theology 
to a series of biblical claims about natural revelation’,52 and attempts 
to show that his ‘model’ does not abolish the philosophical nature 
of natural theology. This is done by distinguishing between three 
ways in which it ‘can depend on Scripture’. The bible can (1) provide 
‘a justification for engaging’ in natural theology;53 (2) ‘eliminate certain 
conclusions of natural theological reasoning’54 and (3) inform ‘what 
the theistic evidence is, and perhaps also what truth about God is said 
to follow from the evidence’.55 However, this attempt of preserving the 
distinction between philosophy and theology does not succeed. In the 
case of (1) it is not natural theology but simply revealed theology. For 
in this case ‘Scripture testifies that there is evidence in the created order 
from which conclusions about the existence and nature of God may be 
inferred’.56 It seems strange that we need revelation in order to engage in 
philosophy. Surely philosophical arguments stand or fall on their own, 
just as theology stands on its own given revelation, and Christians can 
take the existence of God on faith in that revelation. but perhaps if some 
Christians get confused (such as barth, bavinck and their followers) and 
do not understand that establishing whether the proposition ‘God exists’ 
is true is desirable in and of itself, then they may be helped by a revelation 
saying that it can be established apart from revelation. Yet, such an 
argument would be based on revelation and thus not be philosophical but 
theological. In the case of (2) Scripture does supply the actual premises 
against a philosophical argument and thus that counter-argument is not 
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philosophical. besides, if the philosophical argument is sound and valid, 
no divine revelation can eliminate the conclusion; and if the argument is 
unsound and/or invalid, philosophy can itself eliminate the conclusion. 
In the case of (3) the evidence and the inference are accepted on the 
basis of revealed information. It is again ‘a series of biblical claims about 
natural revelation’ and this entire project is merely ‘situated within the 
theological framework of the Christian faith’.57 So this dogmatic model 
does not clarify but confuse natural theology with dogmatic theology.58 
The former section of this paper also shows that Sudduth does not develop 
and defend the traditional ‘reformed endorsement of natural theology.’ 
my second objection is that natural theology should not be developed 
within the tripartite analysis of knowledge as justified or warranted 
true belief. This is, according to Sudduth, a ‘deeply entrenched view 
of knowledge in the western philosophical tradition’ and the recent 
discussions of this ‘framework’ ‘are directly relevant to the role of inference 
and natural theology β’.59 Here it cannot be argued that that analysis is 
erroneous, but that it should not be presumed for natural theology. First, 
analysing knowledge as justified true belief appears to be the most recent 
empiricist attempt to overcome modern scepticism pasted onto Plato’s 
Theaetetus. Not only is it of no more than a mid-twentieth-century 
origin,60 but its interpretation of Theaetetus is mistaken,61 and Gettier 
cases, generality problems, as well as the impasse between first person 
internalism and third person externalism (pertaining to ambiguities about 
‘ground’, ‘adequacy’ and ‘the basing relation’) make it highly dubitable and 
a likely cul-de-sac.62 Second, this analysis misconstrues our concept of 
knowledge.63 For ‘knowing’ is used in diverse contexts with systematically 
diverse sensory, intellectual, actual, dispositional, intuitive, discursive, 
everyday, scientific, theoretical and practical meanings. In the context 
of the senses individual and concrete characteristics of things are known 
from neural signs, whereas in the context of the understanding universal 
and abstract characteristics are known from conventional signs, and so 
on. Thus owing to this ambiguity ‘knowledge’ cannot be defined in terms 
of necessary and sufficient conditions, but its usage in different contexts 
with systematically different meanings can only be described.64 likewise 
the notion of justification is erroneously assumed to be univocal, since 
only in some cases is justification appropriate, but even then it will 
vary in between those cases. It is inappropriate to ask for a justification 
of how I know my name, but it is occasionally appropriate to ask for 
the justification of the conjugation of the latin verb ‘docere’ and the 
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extension of the term ‘aluminium’, although these justifications will be 
very different. moreover, knowing does not entail believing or supposing 
or opining. For this entailment is commonly argued from cases where 
something was known but is not so any longer. For instance, I knew I put 
my shoes under the shelf, but then unbeknownst to me my wife moved 
them into the cellar. under those circumstances I take, suppose or believe 
my shoes to be under the shelf, but I do not know it. Yet, the negative case 
of not-knowing but believing cannot be turned into the positive case of 
knowing therefore believing. For ‘knowing therefore believing’ does not 
follow from ‘not-knowing but believing’. besides, in many situations the 
‘difference between knowing and believing is that between being and not 
being fully confident; and the entailment view would mean, absurdly, 
that not being fully confident is compatible with being fully confident 
(that if a person is not fully confident he may be fully confident)’.65 lastly, 
the framework inherited from modern scepticism is needless, since the 
meaning of the words by which doubt is expressed cannot be doubted, 
some propositions are known by virtue of themselves, and the senses are 
self-correcting.66
Third, rejecting traditional realist and adopting modern sceptical 
epistemology,67 the alternative natural theology Sudduth favours is 
richard Swinburne’s probabilistic argument from simplicity.68 However, 
for all its admirable argumentative rigour, ‘God’ as a simpler explanation 
may be the best explanation only when there is no other evidence – such 
as a demonstrative syllogism (more on this in a moment). Nor does 
simplicity guarantee truth. For a complex explanation may be closer 
to the truth than a simple one, and an as yet unknown hypothesis 
may explain better than any of the known ones.69 even so, Swinburne’s 
theology is an unlikely partner in Sudduth’s project of defending and 
developing natural theology within the reformed tradition. For in 
contradiction to confessional reformed theology, Swinburne apparently 
defends anthropomorphism (univocity), tritheism, Pelagianism and 
Socinianism.70 
last, Sudduth’s replacement of the traditional natural theology in the 
reformed Church in favour of ‘an inductive, cumulative case for theism’ 
is cursory.71 Consider this argumentative sketch:
Whatever is moved is moved by another. 
There cannot be an endless series of moved movers. 
There must be an unmoved mover.72
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much can be said about these deceptively simple sentences, but I will use 
them only to suggest that it is premature to ‘turn away from Aristotelian-
based arguments’.73
It is often heard, and Sudduth claims, that a demonstrative syllogism 
assumes that God is ‘proven in a rationally compelling manner 
from various self-evident or epistemically certain truths’.74 However, 
considerable difficulties face anyone who wishes to argue the existence 
of God philosophically and it would be silly to suppose that the mere 
statement of these three sentences will change anyone’s mind or even 
life. language is a social thing where the speaker has to use words of 
significance for the listener in order to convince him or her. These 
premises are not supposed to be self-evidently true in the sense of ‘the 
denials of which are intrinsically absurd or contradictory’.75 rather it 
is supposed that these sentences only have significance for and can be 
judged true by a listener who has gone through the investigation into 
the fundamental concept of nature, namely change, and asks about 
the ultimate explanation of all change: what is it that gets gravity, 
electromagnetism, and weak and strong radioactivity going? So, the 
syllogism is a very condensed, if not truncated, expression of a vast 
analysis of our primary physical notions.76
Nor is it true that the premises are assumed to ‘have strong epistemic 
credentials’ in the sense that they are pretended to be indubitable, 
infallible or incorrigible by ‘all rational cognizers’. 77 rather they purport 
to depend on the difficult efforts of sensory experience in natural 
science. They are the outcome of abstractive (as opposed to enumerative) 
induction, namely what is (or can be) sensed is taken up in language 
by distinguishing the universal and abstract from the individual and 
concrete. Humans perform such a fundamental operation every day 
(e.g. ‘All dogs bark’), and the premises above assume the inductive 
investigations terminating in the first principle about change. unless we 
have this intellectual power to form universal expressions from sense 
experience, we could not explain why universals apply to individuals.78 
Sudduth does not follow Hume in denying the first premise,79 but 
some clarification of it is needed to avoid misunderstanding. The premise 
follows from the examination culminating in the definition of change as 
the actualisation of what is potentially F insofar as it is potentially F, and 
the demonstration of the subject of change as potentiality. This premise 
is stated in terms of the most well-known kind of change, namely change 
in location or change through space. We constantly sense something 
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moving and a denial of this would itself involve a move. The syllogism 
does not deny that a (typical) dog cannot wag its tail or leap, since in 
such self-motion one part is moving another. In it, as in everyday english, 
the verb ‘move’ (with its derivative ‘mover’) is used both transitively and 
intransitively. The legs of the dog are moved by its central nervous system, 
and when the central nervous system transitively moves the legs, that 
system is intransitively moving. In this way it is claimed that things in 
motion are caused to be in motion by another. Yet, the first premise is 
not merely an application of a principle of causality but one of modality. 
The process of change is the actualisation of what is potential insofar as 
it is potential. The process of change in the dog is the realisation of its 
capacity for leaping insofar as it has capacity for leaping. but potentiality 
cannot actualise itself. So, in order for change to take place, there has to be 
something actual that can cause something potentially F to be actually F.
It seems that Sudduth would not deny the second premise, but it 
may also be misinterpreted. It depends on investigations into actual and 
potential infinity, continuous and discrete quantity, and mathematical 
and physical division. A ‘moved mover’ is something that moves both 
intransitively and transitively. The premise contends that the series of 
what is moving both intransitively and transitively cannot be infinite. 
For moving intransitively and transitively are simultaneous. In leaping 
the legs of the dog and the central nervous system move at the same time, 
and the central nervous system and ions move at the same time, and so 
on. but every potential motion is initiated by something actual, since 
only something actual can cause something potentially F to be actually F. 
If whatever is intransitively moved also is transitively moved, then there 
is always something potential in the cause(s) of whatever is intransitively 
moved. So the second premise does not claim that no series of movers 
cannot stretch back infinitely in time, but that it cannot be infinite at one 
and the same time. There is no regression into an actual infinity in the 
series of causes operating here and now.
The argument concludes then that there must be an unmoved 
mover, namely something that ultimately actualises every potential 
motion here and now. An unmoved mover is what begins the motion 
of what is in motion without being in motion itself. It is something 
that moves transitively but not intransitively. It may be objected that 
this conclusion is very far from what is usually predicated ‘God’, but this 
misconstrues the argument. For this is not a why-demonstration but 
a  that-demonstration;80 it does not demonstrate what something is 
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but that something is. motion is not the cause of the unmoved mover but 
the cause of our knowledge of the unmoved mover. It is granted that 
much further argumentation is needed, and this is what physics and 
metaphysics traditionally undertake. Physics proceeds and culminates 
with the conclusion that the unmoved mover is immaterial and thereby 
establishes a discipline beyond physics, namely metaphysics.81 This latter 
discipline undertakes to further investigate the cause and end of being by 
the laborious attempt to develop a language with which to speak about 
God.82 Then metaphysics is called ‘theology’. Still, arrival at anything like 
the Christian doctrine of God is (arguably) impossible by philosophical 
argumentation.83 This will only be disappointing on the assumption that 
there are or must be facile arguments for God.
CoNCluSIoN
In this paper I have refuted the recent and erroneous opinion that 
there was a peculiar epistemology in the reformed Church which made 
it negative to natural theology. regrettably I have also found michael 
Sudduth’s assessment of this issue faulty. First I argued that there was an 
early and unanimous adoption of natural theology as the culmination of 
physics and the foundation of metaphysics by sixteenth and seventeenth 
century philosophers of good standing in the reformed Church. Second 
I argued that natural theology cannot be based on revelation, should 
not assume a peculiar analysis of knowledge and must not pass over 
demonstrative natural theology.
I began this paper by conceding that its title was confused. However, 
perhaps the title may also suggest that the paper concerns a natural 
theology that has been subjected to reform; maybe freed of errors or 
abuses, and then restored to its previous form. Perhaps after all there is, 
can or should be a ‘reformed’ natural theology after modernity, namely a 
natural theology that is formed on the intelligibility of our most general 
physical concepts and explored in the abstruseness of our metaphysical 
notions. but that is matter for another occasion.84
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Happiness in his Present State: A Rational Enquiry into the Principles of the Modern Deists 
(edinburgh: Andrew Anderson, 1714), and Thomas Chalmers, On Natural Theology, The 
Works of Thomas Chalmers, vol. 1-2 (Glasgow: William Collins, 1835). one could add 
the very early lambert Daneau, Physice Christiana, siue, Christiana de rerum creatarum 
origine et vsu, disputatio, 2 ed. (Geneuæ: Petrus Santandreanus, 1579). I hesitate 
because of its mix of theology and philosophy, but it testifies to an optimistic view of 
philosophy. In the development of my argument below reference will be made to further 
philosophical sources.
5. Plantinga, ‘The reformed objection to Natural Theology’, pp. 49-53, 57-58, and 
Plantinga, ‘reason and belief in God’, pp. 64-73.
6. For example, John beversluis, ‘reforming the “reformed” objection to Natural 
Theology’, Faith and Philosophy 12 (1995), Hunter brown, ‘Alvin Plantinga and Natural 
Theology’, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 91 (1991), Donald Hatcher, 
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‘Plantinga and reformed epistemology: A Critique’, Philosophy and Theology 86 (1986), 
Paul Helm, ‘John Calvin, the sensus divinitatis, and the noetic effects of sin’, International 
Journal for Philosophy of Religion 43 (1998), Paul Helm, Faith with Reason (oxford: 
oxford university Press, 2000), pp. 84-87, Paul Helm, John Calvin’s Ideas (oxford: oxford 
university Press, 2004), pp. 265-76, Derek S. Jeffreys, ‘How reformed is reformed 
epistemology? Alvin Plantinga and Calvin’s ‘Sensus Divinitatis’’, Religious Studies 33 
(1997), Norman Kretzmann, ‘evidence against Anti-evidentialism’, Our Knowledge of 
God: Essays on Natural and Philosophical Theology, ed. K. J. Clark (Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Press, 1992), Stephen maitzen, ‘God and other Theoretical entities’, Topoi 
14 (1995), Duncan Pritchard, ‘reforming reformed epistemology’, International 
Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2003), Thomas A. russman, ‘reformed epistemology’, 
Thomistic Papers IV, ed. leonard A. Kennedy (Houston, TX: Center for Thomistic 
Studies, 1988), Stephen J. Wykstra, ‘on behalf of the evidentialist – A response to 
Wolterstorff ’, Philosophy of Religion in the 21st Century, eds. D. Z. Phillips and Timothy 
Tessin (Gordonsville, VA: Palgrave macmillan, 2001). I evaluated other metaphysical 
and epistemological arguments of Plantinga in Sebastian rehnman, Tänkesätt: Studier 
i Alvin Plantingas filosofi (Skellefteå: Norma, 2004).
7. Alvin Plantinga, ‘reformed epistemology’, A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, 
eds. Charles Taliaferro, Paul Draper and Philip l. Quinn, 2 ed. (malden, mass.: Wiley-
blackwell, 2010), p. 674; Nicholas Wolterstorff, ‘The reformed Tradition’, A Companion 
to Philosophy of Religion, eds. Charles Taliaferro, Paul Draper and Philip l. Quinn, 2 ed. 
(malden, mass.: Wiley-blackwell, 2010). In the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy see, 
for example, Peter Forrest “The epistemology of religion”, sect. 7-8, Charles Talliaferro 
“Philosophy of religion” 4.2, John bishop “Faith” and richard Amesbury “Fideism”. In 
the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy see, for example, Scott macDonald “Natural 
Theology” sect. 2, and William Alston “History of Philosophy of religion”, sects. 1 and 
8. Already in 1997 Jeffreys pointed out that ‘many simply rehearse his [Plantinga’s] 
discussion of Calvin superficially’. Jeffreys, ‘How reformed is reformed epistemology? 
Alvin Plantinga and Calvin’s ‘Sensus Divinitatis’’, p. 419. For a more accurate overview of 
this tradition, see Daniel von Wachter, ‘Protestant Theology’, The Routledge Companion 
to Philosophy of Religion, eds. Chad meister and Paul Copan (london: routledge, 2007).
8. michael Sudduth, The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009).
9. Ibid., cp. pp. 46-47, 49, 53, 101, 50, 77, 225.
10. Ibid., pp. 170-1, 203-09, 26.
11. Ibid., p. 45.
12. Ibid., p. 49.
13. Ibid., p. 4, cp. p. 51.
14. Ibid., pp. 4-5, 52-53. 
15. Ibid., p. 223.
16. Ibid., p. 6.
17. Ibid., p. 223.
18. In this paper I use the terms ‘neo-orthodox’ and ‘neo-orthodoxy’ inclusive of 
both Abraham Kuyper and Karl barth together with their followers. The Concise Oxford 
Dictionary of World Religions (ed. John bowker (oxford: oxford university Press, 
2000)) describes the use of ‘neo-orthodoxy’ in the following way: ‘A Protestant Christian 
reaction against 19th-cent. liberalism in theology. The reaction was not organized, and 
is particularly associated with K. barth. Quintessentially, Neo-orthodoxy rejected the 
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liberal belief that it is possible to argue from experience to God, or, more extremely, that 
theology is disguised anthropology.’ Although Kuyperianism and barthianism differ on 
other issues, they agree in their rejection of arguments to God and are thus in this paper 
both referred to as ‘neo-orthodox’. Cp. also ‘repristination theology’ in bengt Hägglund, 
History of theology, 3 ed. (St. louis: Concordia, 1968), pp. 363-65.
19. unless otherwise indicated, all translations in this paper are my own. 
Abbreviated quotations are indicated in two ways. When a citation is abbreviated 
within one and the same paragraph, this is indicated by ‘[...]’. When a citation is 
abbreviated over two or more paragraphs, this is indicated by ‘[---]’.   
 In this paper I also leave out a distinction that Sudduth emphasises. He 
distinguishes between ‘natural theology α’ and ‘natural theology β’, namely between 
‘natural theology as natural knowledge of God and natural theology as rational proofs 
or arguments’ (Sudduth, The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology, p. 4). However, 
since it is mainly the second half of the distinction that is discussed in his book (apart 
from ‘the immediacy claim’) and this more narrow identification of natural theology has 
dominated the western philosophical tradition (as Sudduth concedes; cp. pp. 1 and 222), 
it suffices to use only the argumentative sense here. 
20. There is, since Hume’s lifetime, a tradition within the reformed Church of arguing 
against him. For instance, George Campbell, A Dissertation on Miracles: Containing an 
Examination of the Principles Advanced by David Hume (edinburgh: Kincaid & bell, 
1762), and Thomas Chalmers, On the Miraculous and Internal Evidences of the Christian 
Revelation, The Works of Thomas Chalmers, vol. 3 (Glasgow: William Collins, 1842), 
pp. 70-146. This majority view contrasts sharply with that of neo-orthodoxy.
21. Sudduth, The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology, p. 2.
22. Ibid., p. 224, similarly p. 26.
23. Ibid., p. 205.
24. Ibid., p. 225.
25. Ibid., pp. 203-09. There is a historical irony in that the prominent philosophers 
Plantinga and Wolterstorff endorse Kuyper’s and bavinck’s Kantian opposition to natural 
theology, while they themselves reject Kantianism: Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian 
Belief (oxford/New York: oxford university Press, 2000), pp. 9-30; Nicholas Wolterstorff, 
‘Is it Possible and Desirable for Theologians to recover from Kant?’, Modern Theology 14 
(1998). 
26. on the twentieth century protestant misunderstanding of the tradition, see the 
sadly neglected Arvin Vos, Aquinas, Calvin, and Contemporary Protestant Thought: 
A Critique of Protestant Views on the Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Grand rapids, mich.: 
eerdmans, 1985).
27. There may be a sociological line of explanation. Cp. George m. marsden, 
Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism (Grand rapids, mich.: W.b. 
eerdmans, 1991), and James D. bratt, Dutch Calvinism in Modern America: A History 
of a Conservative Subculture (Grand rapids: eerdmans, 1984). but Paul Helm reminded 
me that there may be a deeper theological explanation. The neo-orthodox has a different 
doctrine of sin so that they deny the orthodox affirmation of natural theology and 
natural law. Cp. Abraham Kuyper, Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology: Its Principles, trans. 
J. Hendrik De Vries (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1898), and Karl barth, Nein! 
Antwort an Emil Brunner, Theologische existenz heute (münchen: C. Kaiser, 1934).
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28. once Sudduth himself writes ‘there is consensus in the reformed tradition on 
the propriety of the project of developing theistic arguments’ (Sudduth, The Reformed 
Objection to Natural Theology p. 4). Thus there is no analysandum. moreover, there is 
(at least historically) no basis for his distinction between ‘model-specific objections’ 
and ‘project objections’ to natural theology (ibid. pp. 6, 54). For the issue is really only 
about objections to specific uses of natural theology and such objections are found 
in many traditions in and out of the Church (whether reformed or not).  
 Perhaps one may hope that ‘Kuyperian epistemology’ gains acceptance instead 
of ‘reformed epistemology’, since there appears to be no claim to a distinctive theory 
of knowledge in the reformed Church until Abraham Kuyper. See especially Abraham 
Kuyper, Lectures on Calvinism (Grand rapids: eerdmans, 1931, 1898), and Kuyper, 
Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology: Its Principles. Cp. ‘our most influential college teachers 
were all “Kuyperians”.’ Nicholas Wolterstorff, ‘reformed epistemology’, Philosophy of 
Religion in the 21st Century, eds. D. Z. Phillips and Timothy Tessin (Gordonsville, VA: 
Palgrave macmillan, 2001), p. 41.
29. The name comes from Augustine who took it from marcus Terentius Varro who 
seems to reflect a still earlier usage: ‘there are three kinds of theology [...] the second 
physical, [...] may be called natural [... and] is that which philosophers use’. Augustine, 
De civitate Dei, Corpus christianorum, Series latina, vol. 47-48 (Turnholt: brepols, 1954-, 
413-422) VI.v cp. VIII.i, and marcus Tullius Cicero, De natura deorum: liber I, Cambridge 
Greek and latin classics, ed. Andrew r. Dyck (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 
2003, 45), ch. i-ii. The term may have been introduced by a Greek Stoic philosopher 
according to C. C. J. Webb, Studies in the history of natural theology (oxford: Clarendon, 
1915), p. 69, and Werner Jaeger, The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers: The Gifford 
Lectures 1936, trans. edward S. robinson (oxford: Clarendon Press, 1947), pp. 3-4. 
30. For instance, Aristotle, Physics: A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary, 
oxford Classical Text, ed. W. D. ross (oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936) VII-VIII, Aristotle, 
De anima: Edited with Introduction and Commentary, oxford Classical Text, ed. W. D. 
ross (oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), III, Aristotle, Metaphysics: A Revised Text, with 
Introduction and Commentary, oxford Classical Text, ed. W. D. ross, 2 vols. (oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1924), 998b22-27, 1003a33-03b16, 28a29-30, 26a27-32, 64b1-14, 
and generally XII. ‘Aristotle’s identification of first philosophy with natural theology is 
continuous with the approach of his predecessors in the specific and crucial respect that 
the proof for the existence of God is the conclusion of reasoning within the science of 
nature. His further hypothesis that natural theology is identical with the science of being, 
distinct from the science of nature, bears the stamp of Parmenidean dissent from the 
milesian tradition.’ l.P. Gerson, God and Greek Philosophy: Studies in the Early History of 
Natural Theology (london: routledge, 1990), p. 82, cp. p. 96.
31. Pietro martire Vermigli, In primum, secundum et initium tertii libri Ethicorum 
Aristotelis ad Nicomachum commentarius, ed. Guilio Santeranziano (Zürich: Froschauer, 
1563), p. 3, cp. pp. 163, 224, 26, and Pietro martire Vermigli, Loci communes (london: 
John Kyngston, 1576), p. 31. He may have acquired this view while studying under the 
Thomistic chair of metaphysics at the university of Padua. Cp. Thomas Aquinas, Sententia 
libri Metaphysicae, eds. roberto busa and enrique Alarcón, 2 ed. (Taurini: marietti, 1950, 
1270-3) prooemium, lib. 3 l. 6 n. 6 (398), 6.1.27 (1170), 11.7.21 (2267), Thomas Aquinas, 
In Aristotelis libros De sensu et sensato commentarium, ed. raimondo Spiazzi, 3 ed. 
(Taurini: marietti, 1949, 1268-1270), p. l. 1 n. 1 and 4, Thomas Aquinas, Super Boëthium 
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De Trinitate, opera omnia, vol. 50 (rome/Paris: Commissio leonina/Éditions Du Cerf, 
1992, 1257-8), Pars 3 q. 5 a. 3 co. 5, and Aristotle, Physics: A Revised Text with Introduction 
and Commentary 194b15. Vermigli does not think that metaphysics can attain an account 
of the nature of God: Vermigli, In primum, secundum et initium tertii libri Ethicorum 
Aristotelis ad Nicomachum commentarius, p. 82. For God as God is not an object of 
metaphysics, but only as the cause of being, since God is beyond the categories of being: cp. 
Ibid. pp. 224, 158, 156 and 137. Analogical predication about God is therefore treated here 
and there in this work; for example, pp. 142, 151-152, 156, 268-269. For an argument of the 
usefulness of physics in general and for the knowledge of God in particular, see Girolamo 
Zanchi, ‘Prolegómena’, Aristotelous phusikēs akroaseōs ē peri archōn, ed. Girolamo Zanchi 
(Strassburg: Vuendelinus rihelius, 1553). For the general assumption by a philosopher 
in the reformed Church that metaphysics deals with God as the ultimate principle of 
everything and especially of created or separate minds, see for instance rudolphus 
Goclenius, Isagoge in peripateticorum et scholasticorum primam philosophiam, quae dici 
consuevit metaphysica (Frankfurt: Zacharias Palthenius, 1598), praefatio. 
32. bartholomaeus Keckermann, Systema physicum, 3 ed. (Hanover: Ioannes Stockelius, 
1623), p. 828, and bartholomaeus Keckermann, Scientiae metaphysicae compendiosum 
systema, opera omnia quae extant, vol. 1 (Geneva: 1614, 1609), p. 2015 respectively. Cp. 
Philipp melanchthon, ‘De physica’, Philippi Melanchthonis opera quae supersunt omnia, 
ed. Karl Gottlieb bretschneider, Corpus reformatorum (Halle: Schwetschke, 1843, 
1542), XI.558r, Philipp melanchthon, Erotemata dialectices, Philippi melanchthonis 
opera quae supersunt omnia, ed. Karl Gottlieb bretschneider (Halle: Schwetschke, 1846, 
1547), p. 682, Clemens Timpler, Physicæ seu philosophiæ naturalis systema methodicum 
(Hanover: Guilielm Antonius, 1605), epistola dedicatoria 5-6 (my pagination), cap. 
I q. 5 pp. 14-15, cap. II. q 5-9 pp. 27-36, cap. XII q. 5 p. 171, Franco burgersdijk, Idea 
philosophiae naturalis: sive methodus definitorum & controversiarum physicarum (oxford: 
Henry Curteyne, 1641, 1631), pp. 27-30, Gilbertus Jacchaeus, Institutiones physicae 
(Schleusingae: Peter Schmid, 1635), pp. 71-73, and Johannes maccovius, Metaphysica 
theoretico-practica, opuscula philosophica omnia, ed. Nicolai Arnold (Amsterdam: 
elzevir, 1660), pp. 4, 12-14. Compare also the physical basis of natural theology and the 
responses to the objection that ‘natural theology is nothing else than metaphysics’ in 
Alsted, Theologia naturalis: exhibens augustissimam naturæ scholam in quâ creaturæ Dei 
communi sermone ad omnes pariter docendos vtuntur, praefatio pp. 12-13 and pt I p. 8 
respectively. For one succinct formulation of the physical argument that God is, see 
for instance rudolphus Goclenius, Scholae seu disuputationes physicae (marburg: Paul 
egenolph, 1591), pp. 159-60.
33. barlow, Exercitationes aliquot metaphysicae de Deo.
34. Alsted, Theologia naturalis: exhibens augustissimam naturæ scholam in quâ creaturæ 
Dei communi sermone ad omnes pariter docendos vtuntur, praefatio 13.
35. The priority of physica for natural theology in reformed orthodoxy can also be 
seen in the contention that demonstrations for the existence of God can only be from 
effects to cause (a posteriori) and not from cause to effect (a priori). For example, barlow, 
Exercitationes aliquot metaphysicae de Deo, pp. 128-30, 37, 66-67, Johann Heinrich Alsted, 
Metaphysica, tribus libris tractata (Herborn: 1616), p. 87, and Johannes maccovius, 
Distinctiones et regulae theologicae ac philosophicae, ed. Nicolai Arnold (oxford: roberti 
blagrave, 1656, 1653), p. 169. The first thing humans understand is that they sense reality 
or something real. For ‘there is nothing in the intellect that was not before in the senses’. 
168 SebASTIAN reHNmAN
(burgersdijk, Idea philosophiae naturalis: sive methodus definitorum & controversiarum 
physicarum, p. 94.) So, the proper object of human intelligence is what material things are, 
and they are therefore the kind of being that is the principal human analogate through 
which other kinds of being may be causally known. Thus the subject of metaphysics can 
only be described by reasoning from material effects to immaterial causes. This view is, by 
the way, another instance of Plantinga’s discontinuity with the reformed tradition: Alvin 
Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), pp. 197-221.  
 This may also be the place to comment on Sudduth’s material on intuition. Chapters 
3-5 are all devoted to ‘immediate knowledge of God’. Sudduth struggles to clarify what 
cognitio Dei insita signifies in sixteenth and seventeenth century reformed thought, but 
ends in claiming both that ‘it is not inferential’ and that it ‘is spontaneously inferred’ 
(p. 70; cp. pp. 97-99). Part of the problem seems to be that he conflates the traditional 
account that knowledge always begins from non-inferential sensory experience, with the 
modern view that there is knowledge independent of and logically prior to the senses. 
(‘There is an important continuity, then, between [intuition in] the above nineteenth-
century Calvinistic theologians and [cognitio insita in] the reformed scholastics.’ 
(p. 74)) Thus he can claim that ‘intuition yields a priori beliefs’ (p. 129), which obviously 
is incompatible with traditional epistemology. There occur, though, more correct 
formulations (pp. 4, 57). Henceforth I bypass this issue.
36. In the philosophical genre, Sudduth only refers twice to Alsted’s Theologia naturalis, 
but seems not acquainted with this primary text but rather dependent on secondary 
literature.
37. Sudduth, The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology, p. 48, cp. p. 67.
38. John Platt, Reformed Thought and Scholasticism: The Arguments for the Existence 
of God in Dutch theology, 1575-1650 (leiden: brill, 1982), and richard A. muller, Post-
Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, 
ca. 1520 to ca. 1725, 4 vols. (Grand rapids: baker Academic, 2003), especially vols. 1 
and 3. There are many references to sixteenth and seventeenth sources in Sudduth’s first 
and third chapter, but they seem to be taken from Platt and muller. He produces more 
original material on the nineteenth century.
39. Apologetics appears first to have been placed in the theological curriculum by 
Gottlieb Jakob Planck, Einleitung in die theologische Wissenschaften, 2 vols. (leipzig: 
Crusius, 1794), I.xiv, 27-363, II.93-489, and Friedrich Schleiermacher, Kurze Darstellung 
des theologischen Studiums (berlin: realschulbuchhandlung, 1811), pp. 14-19, 92. 
(For these names I am indebted to b.b. Warfield, ‘Apologetics’, The Works of Benjamin 
B. Warfield, eds. ethelbert D. Warfield, William Park Armstrong and Caspar Wistar 
Hodge, vol. 9 (New York: oxford university Press, 1932, 1908), p. 3 (although Plank’s 
and Schleiermacher’s works do not appear in the bibliography). Warfield’s article was 
originally published in The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge, 
I.232-238.) Planck and Schleiermacher are concerned with the divine origin of the 
Christian religion and the Church, but not explicitly with arguments for God’s existence. 
The invention of the theological discipline of apologetics does not however deny the 
obvious, namely that Christians have since antiquity defended their faith and that many 
works in reformed dogmatics contain arguments for the existence of God.  
 Here it may be worth digressing on arguments that God exists in works of 
seventeenth century reformed dogmatics. First, these are normally not demonstrative 
syllogisms but rhetorical syllogisms or enthymeme. For instance, Françesco Turrettini, 
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Institutio theologicae elencticae (Geneva: Samuel de Tournes, 1679-85), I.iii.7-8, III.i.5-21. 
Thus they are known to be incomplete (cp. Franco burgersdijk, Institutionum logicarum, 
libri duo (london: roger Daniels, 1651, 1637), p. 193). Second, the full title of such 
academic works often reveals a polemical aim, where ‘elencticae’ in Turrettini’s title 
comes from the Greek elegkhos, ‘examination’ or ‘refutation’. These arguments serve ‘only 
an interest in systematic completeness. [---] Their discussions of the proofs recognise 
fully that believers fundamentally and ultimately need no proof precisely because they 
are believers – but also that believers do need, mediately, as it were, tools and weapons 
for the spiritual arsenals. The proofs fill a need in a world where doubts arise and atheists 
abound.’ muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: The Rise and Development of 
Reformed Orthodoxy, ca. 1520 to ca. 1725, III.170, cp. p. 79. Third, the place of such 
arguments can be explained in terms of the educational system. The original audience of 
such works already had a thorough training in philosophy and particularly in arguments 
about God both in physics and metaphysics before they entered the study of theology. 
Cp. Joseph S. Freedman, ‘Philosophy Instruction within the Intitutional Framework 
of Central european Schools and universities during the reformation era’, History of 
Universities 5 (1985), Joseph S. Freedman, ‘Classifications of Philosophy, the Sciences, 
and the Arts in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century europe’, Modern Schoolman 72 
(1994). Such arguments thus simply rehearse that the statement ‘God exists’ is intelligible 
outside the context of revelation. These works likely also points to the (future) homiletical 
context of their readers by the use of rhetorical syllogisms. 
40. Several historical studies have in different ways established that it was only during 
the so-called enlightenment that natural theology began to be used primarily in order 
to justify individual acts of faith. For instance, Guy de broglie, ‘la vraie notion thomiste 
des praeambula fidei’, Gregorianum 34 (1953), Nicholas Wolterstorff, ‘The migration of 
Theistic Arguments: From Natural Theology to evidentialist Apologetics’, Rationality, 
Religious Belief, and Moral Commitment, eds. robert Audi and William J. Wainwright 
(Ithaca/london: Cornell university Press, 1986), Nicholas Wolterstorff, John Locke and 
the Ethics of Belief (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1996), pp. 118-33, John 
Clayton, Religions, Reasons and Gods: Essays in Cross-Cultural Philosophy of Religion, eds. 
Anne m. blackburn and Thomas D. Carroll (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 
2006) pp. 184-309. For a brief development and defence of the traditional (as opposed 
to the enlightenment) conception of natural theology, see Sebastian rehnman, ‘Natural 
Theology and epistemic Justification’, Heythrop Journal 48 (2010).
41. Sudduth, The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology, cp. pp. 150-52, probably 
following early twentieth century reformed theologians.
42. Ibid., p. 172.
43. Ibid., p. 53. by this phrase Sudduth appears to mean that ‘reason plays a substantive 
and formative role in the dogmatic system, including the subtle implication that faith, or 
at least the reasonableness of faith, rests on the prior establishment by reason of Christian 
doctrine’. (p. 53; cp. p. 101) ‘It is an autonomous system based solely on the resources on 
human reason and constituting a justificatory preface to the system of revealed theology.’ 
(p. 150) The Aristotelian position does of course not entail that; nor has that tradition 
claimed demonstrative syllogisms ‘under the influence of modern foundationalism’. Ibid. 
p. 172. 
44. Ibid., p. 177.
170 SebASTIAN reHNmAN
45. In his ‘Dedication’ Descartes writes that one ought to begin with demonstrations 
of the existence of God and the immortality of the soul by philosophical rather than 
theological arguments, and then in the meditations he attempts to prove these from his 
ideas about God and consciousness: rené Descartes, Meditationes de prima philosophia, 
Œuvres de Descartes, eds. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, vol. 7 (Paris: Vrin, 1996, 1640).
46. Cp. Christian von Wolff, Theologia naturalis, methodo scientifica pertractata. 
Pars Prior, integrum Systema complectens, qua existentia et attributa Dei a posteriori 
demonstrantur (Frankfurt: officina libraria rengeriana, 1736), § 9. The position is not 
clear however. 
47. Isaac Sigfrid and Daniel Wyttenbach, Theses theologicæ præcipua Christianæ 
doctrinæ capita continentes (Frankfurt: Hort, 1749), cp. i-iii with xiii-xvi. These 
disputations were held in 1747. In consideration of Sudduth’s commendation of the work 
of richard Swinburne (as will be seen below), it may be worth noting here the similarity 
between the accounts of Sigfrid/Wyttenbach and richard Swinburne, Revelation: From 
Metaphor to Analogy, 2 ed. (oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), pp. v-vi, 79-85.
48. Sudduth, The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology p. 145. ‘The dogmatic model 
of natural theology β presupposes that natural theistic arguments are the product of 
human reason as it operates in the regenerate mind.’ In other words, natural theology on 
the basis of faith.
49. Ibid., p. 5, cp. pp. 53, 99-101, 41-42, 55-64, 223, 26 (where the words ‘function 
and ‘model’ are used for the same content). usually Sudduth contrasts two ‘models’ 
of natural theology. His preferred model is internal to and the other is ‘external to 
dogmatic’, supernatural or revealed theology (pp. 4-5, 52-53). once three ‘functions’ of 
natural theology are named: ‘the dogmatic’, ‘the pre-dogmatic’ and ‘the apologetic’. but 
‘the apologetic function’ appears to be reducible to, or part of, the ‘dogmatic function 
of natural theology’, since it signifies ‘digressions within the dogmatic system designed 
to counter atheistic objections, or at any rate, designed to supply the Christian with 
such responses’ (p. 53). moreover, on p. 101 the two models are contrasted in terms of 
‘apologetics and the-predogmatic model’. Within Christian doctrine, apologetics is said 
to have a function to ‘refute atheological objections’ and remove ‘important obstacles’ to 
as well as to trigger ‘theism’ (pp. 141-142). 
50. Ibid., p. 227.
51. Ibid., p. 155.
52. Ibid., p. 154.
53. Ibid., p. 155.
54. Ibid., p. 157.
55. Ibid., p. 159.
56. Ibid., p. 156.
57. Ibid., p. 223. Natural theology is ‘driven by the same goals as dogmatic theology’ (p. 227).
58. The primary source for Sudduth’s dogmatic ‘model’ of natural theology may be 
what Wolterstorff describes as the neo-orthodox misunderstanding of the Augustinian 
motto fides quaerens intellectum ‘to develop history, sociology, philosophy, political 
theory, and so forth, in the light of faith’. Another source may be Swinburne’s Paleyian 
account. Cp.Wolterstorff, ‘reformed epistemology’, p. 42, richard Swinburne, Faith and 
Reason, 2 ed. (oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), pp. 91-92, and Sudduth, The Reformed 
Objection to Natural Theology, p. x. 
171A reFormeD NATurAl THeoloGY
59. Sudduth, The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology, pp. 82, 128. With the 
theological interests and assumptions of Sudduth one would expect him to be a bit 
hesitant to accommodate himself to the modern paradigm of reducing all kinds of assent 
to ‘belief ’, since in his tradition to believe is only to assent to the extrinsic evidence of 
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1850-1855, 1677), pp. 82-84, with analysis in Sebastian rehnman, ‘Graced response: 
John owen on Faith and reason’, Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und 
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Zagzebski, ‘The Inescapability of Gettier Problems’, Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1994), 
Keith Allen Korcz, ‘recent Work on the basing relation’, American Philosophical 
Quarterly 34 (1997), e. Conee and r. Feldman, ‘The Generality Problem for reliabilism’, 
Philosophical Studies 89 (1998). Although it may be a bit of wishful thinking, ‘it seems 
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(oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 51-87 (‘analogy’ in his sense), richard Swinburne, 
The Christian God (oxford: oxford university Press, 1994), pp. 170-91, and richard 
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